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INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE
PURCHASE OF LAND IN NEBRASKA
James R. Hancock * 3
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study, one of thirteen now being conducted
in midwestern states, is to discuss some major problems facing a
buyer when he signs an installment contract to purchase land.
The information is not designed to answer all of the intricate legal
problems which arise but rather is intended to inform prospective
buyers of pitfalls so they can protect their interests by seeking
proper advice.
Statistics compiled by the United States Department of Agri-
culture show land purchases by installment contracts have in-
creased in recent years. In 1956, approximately 9.6 percent of all
land transactions in Nebraska were by installment contracts. In
1957, the percentage had risen to 13.4. From the viewpoint of
buyers, if use of installment contracts can serve their needs better
than mortgages but not disproportionately increase the risk, utili-
zation of such agreements would appear economically advan-
tageous. On the other hand, if contracts give an unfair advantage
to the one with superior bargaining power, their use should be
undertaken only with a full understanding of the consequences.
Therefore, this study compares land contracts with mortgages to
show the advantagessand disadvantages of each.
A. THEORY OF A LAND CONTRACT
An installment land contract is an agreement for the purchase
and sale of a specific parcel of land.2 Usually, after a small down
• LL.B. 1959, University of Nebraska. Presently associated with the
firm of Wright, Simmons & Harris, Scottsbluff, Nebraska.
1 This is one of a series of articles written under the sponsorship of the
Agricultural Economics Division, College of Agriculture, University of
Nebraska, for the purpose of providing a summarization of the law
of installment land contracts.
2 Apking v. Hoefer, 74 Neb. 325, 104 N.W. 177 (1905); Wilderman v.
Watters, 149 Neb. 102, 30 N.W.2d 301 (1948); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts,§ 234, p. 757; See also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-205 (Reissue 1950) which
states that the intent of the parties must be derived from the entire
instrument.
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payment, the buyer makes payments over a specified period of
time at the conclusion of which he receives full title.3 While the
periodic payments continue, he has the use, possession and control
of the property even though title remains in the seller. Under
these circumstances, the law recognizes that the buyer should bear
the duties of ownership. Therefore, the doctrine of equitable con-
version splits the title into (1) the bare legal title retained by the
seller and (2) all other ownership characteristics transferred to
the buyer.4  In other words, the buyer has an equitable estate
composed of all rights and duties of ownership while the seller
holds legal title as security, subject to those rights.5
Because of equitable conversion, the situation is analogous to
a mortgage. For example, if a buyer purchases land, receives title
and gives a mortgage back, he has almost the identical estate so
far as the possession, use and control of the land are concerned as
he would have under a contract.
One of the most .generally recognized practical disadvantages
of mortgages is that mortgagees demand larger initial payments
than do those selling on land contracts. On the other hand, the
practical disadvantage of land contracts is the lack of adequate
statutory. safeguards against strict foreclosure. These considera-
tions are more fully explored in subsequent portions of this paper.
3 See Justice v. Button, 89 Neb. 67, 131 N.W. 871 (1925) which holds
that the seller need not have perfect title atethe time of execution,
but impliedly must perfect it at performance time; but that title must
be marketable; Tierney v. Dietsch, 110 Neb. 462, 194 N.W. 475 (1923);
McLaughlin v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 308, 202 N.W. 871 (1925). See also
Northouse v. Torstenson, 146 Neb. 187, 19 N.W.2d 34 (1945) which
states that a marketable title is one which can be sold readily to a
reasonably prudent man. For other standards, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§
76-601 to 76-644 (Reissue 1958). Comments in connection with each
section plus other standards of title .examination which have not been
legislatively approved may be found in the Nebraska Lawyer's Desk
Book.
4 See Stukenholtz v. Parriott, 113 Neb. 296, 202 N.W. 873 (1875) which
held that a buyer is not entitled to possession unless expressly provided
in the contract. For the rule of equitable conversion, see United
States v. Sode, 93 F. Supp. 398 (1950); In re Wiley's Estate, 150 Neb.
898, 36 N.W.2d 483 (1949), opinion supplemented 151 Neb. 633, 38
N.W.2d 434 (1949); Jewett v. Black, 60 Neb. 173, 82 N.W. 365 (1900).
5 I Glen, Mortgages, § 14 (1943); Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Fischer,
137 Neb. 559, 290 N.W. 444 (1940); Edminister v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265
(1877). See also 17 Neb. L. Bul. 54 (1938).
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II. SOME MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS UNDER A
LAND CONTRACT
k. ESCRow AGREEMENTS
Common practice is to place the deed in escrow until provi-
sions of the contract have been performed." This places control
of the title in a neutral third party who must deliver the deed
according to the terms of the escrow agreement. By definition,
an escrow is "a written instrument which by its terms imports
a legal obligation, and which is deposited by the grantor ... with
a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depository until the
performance of a condition or the happening of a certain event,
and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee or obligee." 7
A completed -escrow transaction is composed of two deliveries.
The first delivery is to the depository "in escrow" and the second
is to the buyer. The initial delivery must be irrevocable and
made8 to one who is not the agent of either party." Delivery does
not take place until it is apparent that it was intended by the
parties.'0 The first delivery does not affect the seller's title and
the deed is ineffective until given by the escrow agent to the
buyer."
The escrow agent, who is sometimes spoken of as the agent
of both parties,1 2 must deliver to the buyer upon performance of
the conditions or return the deed to the seller upon nonperform-
ance. He, of course, exercises discretion as to when the conditions
have been performed and substantial performance is insufficient.
6 McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 307, 186 N.W. 74, 22 A.L.R. 567 (1921).
Also see 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 364 (5th ed. 1941).
7 Killeen v. Doran, 118 Neb. 750, 754, 226 N.W. 435, 437 (1929).
8 Willis v. Sponsler, 117 Neb. 1, 223 N.W. 637 (1928); Milligan v. Milligan,
161 Neb. 499, 74 N.W.2d 274 (1955); Ambler v. Jones, 102 Neb. 40, 165
* N.W. 886 (1917) (where it was held that even if the wife signed the
deed that was in escrow, she must also sign the escrow contract when
it was for her homestead); Hill v. Natlor, 99 Neb. 791, 157 N.W. 922
(1915).
9 Ladman v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 130 Neb. 460, 265 N.W. 252
(1930), where delivery was held incomplete when made to the agent
of donor. Wier v. Batdorf, 24 Neb. 83, 38 N.W. 22 (1888) where de-
livery of deed was held insufficient.
10 Milligan v. Milligan, 161 Neb. 499, 74 N.W.2d 74 (1955).
11 Robertson v. Reiter, 38 Neb. 198, 56 N.W. 877 (1893).
12 Farming Corp. v. Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 202 N.W. 911 (1925).
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Strict compliance with the conditions of the contract is essential. 13
If the agent is honestly uncertain concerning whether the contract
has been performed, he may hold back performance and interplead.
the other party when court proceedings are commenced. 4 If it
is found that the depository has honestly detained the deed in an
attempt to ascertain true ownership, he will not be liable for con-
version.' 5 He cannot, however, in violation of his trust convey
good title to another.'6
The first delivery merely assures the buyer that the deed will
be available when he has performed. Consequently, the deed is
not recorded at this time as a conveyance although the contract of
sale is usually recorded. Legal title remains in the seller. The
delivery of the deed into escrow does not prevent subsequent, re-
corded liens from attaching to the land. So, if the buyer's contract
is unrecorded these subsequent interests, if recorded, will prevail
over him even though the deed is in escrow. Because of this
possibility, some jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of relation-
back. This doctrine treats the second delivery as having taken
place at the time of the first delivery and has been applied in cases
where: (1) the seller marries subsequent to the first delivery
but prior to the second, (2) the seller dies or becomes insane or,
(3) he has leased the property. The relation-back doctrine, being
a form of equitable relief, is not recognized except to avoid an in-
equitable result. Thus, it also has been employed to .ward off
liens of the seller's creditors.' 7
B. TAXES
Ordinarily, taxes on real property are payable by the owner.
For purposes of taxation, a land contract is treated as a mortgage
to the extent of the unpaid purchase price, and the mortgagee
and buyer must pay taxes in proportion to that interest.'8 Usually
13 Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953).
'4 Farming Corp. v. Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 202 N.W. 911 (192).
15 Ibid.
16 Cotton v. Gregory, 10 Neb. 125, 4 N.W. 939 (1880), where the rule was
stated but held inapplicable when grantee accepted part of the benefits.
17 See generally 30 C.J.S., Escrows, § 13, p. 1218; Annot., 117 A.L.R. 84.
For authority that the doctrine does apply against eeditors of the
vendor, see Stokewell v. Shalit, 204 Mass. 270, 90 N.E. 570 (1910);
Whitfield v. Harris, 48 Miss. 710 (1873); but see May v. Emerson, 52
Ore. 262, 96 Pac. 454, 16 Ann. Cas. 1129 (1908).
Is Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1401 (Reissue 1950). See also III American Law
of Property, § 11.35, p. 101 (1952).
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the buyer agrees in the contract to pay all of the taxes and, if the
contract is recorded, he is assessed for all of the taxes.
C. IMPROVEMNTS
Improvements which a buyer would reasonably assume are
part of the freehold pass under a contract of sale if no contrary
intent appears.' 9 In Roden v. Williams,20 the defendant sold land
to the plaintiff without mentioning that defendant's tenant owned
improvements consisting of a granary, a big shed, a cattle shed,
a hog shed and a privy. When the tenant removed these buildings
after the signing of the contract, it was held that the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff for their value because they were im-
provements which the plaintiff, without notice to the contrary,
had a right to assume were part of the land.
D. CRoPs
"Crops", a term used in this discussion to mean only annual
crops such, as corn, wheat and rye which are grown by planting
and cultivation, are frequently classified by courts either as per-
sonal property or as real property to determine their disposition
under various circumstances such" as in case of death, default, or
foreclosure. One of the chief incidents of real property ownership
is the right to receive profits from the -land in the form of rent
and crops. Thus, recent cases support the view that these rights
pass to the buyer, devisee or heir 'of the land unless a contrary
intent appears.2 '
Historically, courts ruled that mature crops, those requiring
no further support from the soil, were personal property and that
unmatured crops were real estate. The Nebraska Supreme Court
rejected this distinction, however,. and adopted the view that un-
harvested crops, unless reserved to the seller in the land contract,
become the property of a buyer when he takes possession. Har-
19 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-104 (Reissue 1950) states in part, "An otherwise
effective conveyance of property transfers the entire interest which
the conveyor has and has the power to convey, unless an intent to
transfer a less interest is effectively manifested ..
20 100 Neb. 46, 158 N.W. 360 (1916).
21 See generally, 15 Am. Jur., Crops, § 11, p. 202; see also Roden v.
Williams, supra. Crops are regarded as appurtenant to realty 9nd
pass by deed unless a contrary intent appears. Cooper v. Kennedy,
86 Neb. 119, 124 N.W. 1129 (1910); In re Estate of Anderson, 83 Neb. 8,
118 N.W. 1108 (1908).
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vested crops, of course, are not appurtenant to realty and therefore
title to them does not pass to the buyer but remains in the seller.2 2
Even though a buyer defaults and title to the land is in litiga-
tion, he may harvest the crops; and this is true even though the
buyer has been divested of possession. It has been held that such
a right is unavailable to one the court finds occupied the land as
a trespasser. 23 Further, when the defaulted contract contains for-
feiture provisions of both land and crops, the buyer or his tenant
may still harvest the crops until the seller has taken legal action
to regain possession. 24
1. Status of Crops After Judicial Sale
Annual growing crops belonging to the debtor do not pass to
the buyer at foreclosure sales in Nebraska2 5 and whether severed
or not such crops are classified as personalty. Therefore, the
debtor who loses possession by virtue of foreclosure proceedings
may still re-enter to harvest crops.2 6 This view, followed by only
a minority of courts, has been criticized for not giving effect to
the intent of the parties.27 It encourages uninterrupted tillage to
the soil, however, when title to the land on which the crops are
growing remains unsettled and on this basis the rationale appears
sound.
E. INSURANCE
Some jurisdictions, including Nebraska, by applying the doc-
trine of equitable conversion, place the entire risk of loss on the
22 8 Thompson, Real Property, § 4581, p. 528 (1940); See Annot., 95 A.L.R.
1127 (1935).
23 Warner v. Sohn, 86 Neb. 519, 125 N.W. 1072 (1910).
24 Sornberger v. Berggren, 20 Neb. 339, 30 N.W. 413 (1886). See also
Perkins v. Potts, 52 Neb. 110, 71 N.W. 1017 (1897) where it was held
that in the absence of legal action by the seller to regain possession,
an attornment was void and the buyer through his tenant retained
legal possession.
25 Aldrich v. Bank of Ohiowa, 4 Neb. 276, 89 N.W. 726 (1876); Foss v.
Marr, 40 Neb. 559, 59 N.W. 122 (1894); Jensen v. Gurley Grain Co.,
128 Neb. 266, 258 N.W. 549 (1935).
26 Jensen v. Gurley Grain Co., 128 Neb. 266, 258 N.W. 549 (1935).
27 See note, 15 Neb. L. Bul. 399 (1937) where the rule is compared with
the majority rule. For cases holding that rights to crops as well as
rent are so much a part of the land that they descend as realty, see
Hahn v. Verrett, 143 Neb. 820, 11 N.W.2d 551 (1943); Hiatt v. Hiatt, 146
Neb. 652, 20 N.W.2d 921 (1909).
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buyer whether he is in or out of possession.2 Other jurisdictions
place the risk of loss on the one who by the contract will possess
the land. The latter rule seems more equitable because it is more
probable that the person who is in possession of the land will be
able to explain a loss than it is for one who is not in possession.
For this reason the latter rule has received favorable comment by
legal writers.29
In Nebraska, both a seller and a buyer have an insurable in-
terest and may insure the property for its full insurable amount
and collect the entire proceeds in case of destruction. A special
difficulty arises, however, when the seller continues to insure the
property after a contract has been executed and then destruction
occurs. Theoretically, he has nothing to insure because the buyer
has the risk of loss. What should be done with the proceeds of
the insurance? Some authorities hold that the seller may keep
them even though the buyer remains liable for the full purchase
price. By this rule, the seller profits by the amount of the com-
pensable damage even though the title he will ultimately convey is
deficient to the extent of the damage. Nebraska's rule in this
respect is a fairer one and specifies that if the seller insures the
property and destruction occurs, the purchase price is reduced to
the extent of the insurance recoveryr. 3O The remainder of the
loss falls on the buyer.
The buyer should insure the property. By doing so, he is in
a better position to insure to a higher or more current percentage
of value as well as to provide coverage for improvements to the
property.
F. WASTE
In the previous section, consideration was given to the rights
and liabilities of the parties to the contract if destruction of the
subject matter occurred through no one's negligence. This topic
concerns actions available to the parties if destruction occurs
through negligence. If one of the parties to the contract commits
a negligent act, the other party's remedy is called "waste". Where
third persons are liable, the action is for trespass.
28 See generally, Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable
Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale Law Journal 754 (1935), and III
American Law of Property, § 11.31, p. 96 (1952).
29 Ibid.
30 McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22 A.L.R. 567 (1921).
There was a large discrepancy between the insurance recovery and
the actual value of the house, which the buyer must absorb.
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Waste is the destruction, material alteration, or deterioration
of all or a material part of the freehold by any person rightfully in
possession but who has neither fee title nor the full estate.31 If
the seller has retained possession pending completion of the con-
tract, he is liable to the buyer for injuries to the property beyond
ordinary depreciation or deterioration. 32
The principles of waste in the law of mortgages are applicable
to land contracts. The general rule is that when the buyer is in
possession under a land contract he can do nothing which will
impair the security of the seller.33 Nebraska has held that an in-
junction is available to the mortgagee to prevent deterioration of
the land.3 4
G. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
If damage to the property occurs through the negligent or
willful acts of third persons, an action of trespass may be brought.
Because it arises out of an invasion of the right to possession, it
is available to a buyer in possession. 35 An allegation that the
plaintiff is the equitable owner of the premises under a contract
of sale at the time of loss is sufficient for the buyer to maintain
a cause of action.36 The buyer cannot, however, recover for more
than his portion of the loss measured by the percentage paid of
the total purchase price. 37
The reader may wonder why a buyer may recover from third
persons only those damages proportionate to his paid-in equity
but in the prior insurance illustration the buyer received full
credit on the purchase price for the insurance proceeds received
by the seller. Because the doctrine of equitable conversion places
as between the parties the full loss on the buyer, it would seem
that he logically could recover from third parties the entire amount
31 See generally, 55 Am. Jur., Vendor & Purch, § 390.
32 Hayman v. Rownd, 82 Neb. 598, 118 N.W. 328 (1908); Fawn Lake Ranch
Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918); Bee Bldg. Co. v.
Peters Trust Co., 106 Neb. 294, 183 N.W. 302 (1921).
33 III American Law of Property, § 11.22 (1952).
34 Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 130 Neb. 433, 265 N.W. 241 (1936), where the
waste alleged was the removal of growing timber.
35 See generally, III American Law of Property, § 11.33 (1952); H. &
G., I. R. R. v. Ingalls, 15 Neb. 123, 16 N.W. 762 (1883); Gartner v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 71 Neb. 444, 98 N. W. 1052 (1904).
36 Gartner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 71 Neb. 444, 98 N.W. 1052 (1904).
37 H & G., I. R. R. v. Ingalls, 15 Neb. 123, 16 N.W. 762 (1883).
INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASE OF LAND 961
of losses sustained which he ultimately must replace. This anomaly.
is an outgrowth of old distinctions between law and equity and
does not necessarily repudiate the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion. Presently, there is no logical necessity for the rule because:
(1) a buyer may recover for only that portion of the entire loss
which he must bear by equitable conversion and (2) trespassers
benefit in cases where an absentee seller is unavailable or other-
wise is unwilling to be joined as a party plaintiff.
The best course is for the buyer to join the seller as either a
party plaintiff or defendant if the purchase price has not fully
been paid, and there is some indication in the cases that there
might be a defect of parties if this is not done.38 The seller in
such an action cannot complain that the buyer is in default under
the contract or that the contract is insufficient in law. The primary
consideration of the court in awarding damages is that the real
party in interest has been compensated, and that the defendant
will not be subject to another suit for the same damages. If the
seller is not joined as a party, he may recover in a later action
for damages to the extent of his interest in the property, measured
by the unpaid purchase price.
H. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BUYER TO THE SELLER'S
CREDITORS AND ASSIGNEES
Consideration should now be given whether a buyer's right to
pay his seller under the contract is affected either by notice of an
assignment by the seller or by registration of a judgment against
the seller. In Nebraska a judgment rendered in, or transferred to,
the county where the land is located becomes a lien against the
judgment debtor's lands.3 9 If the seller is a debtor, lands sold by
him on contract become subject to the judgment lien because the
seller has title. If the contract is executed before such judgment
decree, the buyer's interest is superior to the seller's creditors
regardless of whether the contract is recorded.
40
38 Gartner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., supra, note 36. If the buyer has
not paid the entire purchase price, he cannot recover for more than
his portion of the loss. Murphy v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 101 Neb.
73, 161 N.W. 1048 (1917).
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1504 (Reissue 1956).
40 Omaha Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Turk, 146 Neb. 859, 21 N.W.2d 865 (1946),
where it was held that the prior filing of a judgment has no effect
on the priority of a mortgage then in existence, the only requirement
being that the mortgage be duly recorded before it is entitled to
priority.
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The judgment becomes a lien only on the seller's interest which,
of course, is the unpaid purchase price.4 1 Therefore, every pay-
ment the buyer makes to the seller after the lien attaches hurts
the creditor because in effect, an amount of land equal to each
payment is transferred to the buyer in fraud of the creditor.
The question thus arises: when and to whom may a buyer
safely make payments after a judgment lien has attached? Ne-
braska has held that the mere filing of a judgment against the
seller is not constructive notice to the buyer of the judgment
creditor's rights.4 2 In other words, the law places no burden on
the buyer to search the records before each payment to ascertain
whether liens have attached since the last prior payment. He
may safely pay until he has actual notice of the judgment lien.
No Nebraska Supreme Court case decides what constitutes actual
notice, but dicta in Filley v. Duncan indicates that positive action
by a creditor in the form of a creditor's bill is necessary to modify
the buyer's duty to pay pursuant to the contract terms. 43 This
view appears to be a sound one because neither constructive nor
actual notice is a proper criterion for modifying a prior contract.
After actual notice is received, the buyer is required to assume
the initiative in determining to whom he can safely make pay-
ments. Otherwise, he would pay at his peril. Fairness would
seem to require that this burden should be on the creditor but
nevertheless the majority of other states which have decided the
question hold that the buyer can continue safely to pay his seller
only until he receives actual notice. Until Filley v. Duncan is
reaffirmed, a prudent buyer in Nebraska should follow the ma-
jority rule. After notice, the buyer should be cautious in making
41 Courtnay v. Parker, 16 Neb. 311, 20 N.W. 120 (1884); Bauermeister v.
McDonald, 124 Neb. 142, 247 N.W. 424 (1932); Olander v. Tighe, 43
Neb. 344, 61 N.W. 633 (1895).
42 Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 546, 76 N.W. 13 (1898).
43 1 Neb. 134 (1871). At page 144, the Court said, 'Whether a .simple
notice to the vendee of the existence of judgment liens acquired since
her contract, would be sufficient to make any further payments to
the vendor, the judgment debtor, at her own peril, it is unnecessary
to decide. In my opinion, however, it is not. In a proceeding in the
nature of a creditor's 'bill, payment could be enjoined until the rights
of the parties are determined. The party who seeks to interfere with
and override a lawful transaction, and intercept payments due under
legal obligations, and have the same applied in satisfaction of his
claims should, it seems to me, provide himself with authority from
some competent power." This theory is unique and other authority
supporting this view could not be found.
INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASE OF LAND 963
further payments without first consulting both the judgment
creditor and the seller. A possible arrangement to protect the
buyer would be for him, with consent of the others, to pay the
judgment and deduct the amount paid from the remaining balance
due on the purchase price. Such payment has been made and
successfully deducted where the incumbrance was in the nature
of a tax lien.
44
In the other situation, assignment by the seller, the seller's
assignee stands in the same shoes as the seller, so the buyer can
safely pay the seller in discharge of his obligation until he has
notice of the assignment. 45
I. STATUTORY INTEREST OF SURVIVING SPOUSE IN DECEASED'S
CONTRACT EQurry
In Nebraska, dower and curtesy, which were the surviving
spouses' legal share of the deceased's property, have been abol-
ished.46 Dower was the wife's share of the husband's estate and
curtesy was the husband's share of the wife's estate. In their
place, Nebraska has by statute given the surviving spouse, man
or wife, a definite percentage of the deceased spouse's property.47
This statutory interest is actually an enlargement of the dower-
curtesy laws for it applies to both real and personal property.
Before dower and curtesy were eliminated in 1907, a wife in Ne-
braska had no dower rights in property of this nature because
the husband had only possession and equitable title during his
lifetime, not a freehold estate.48 At the present time, however,
44 Mill v. Saunders, 4 Neb. 190 (1875). It is doubted whether the vendee
could do this as a matter of right. After notice, it would to a certain
extent be a cloud on the title that the vendor could convey in the
same way as a tax lien (if the vendee did not have the duty to pay it)
so there is some logic in allowing a vendee to do it. This may be
more enhanced where the contract provides for a warranty deed with
usual convenant against encumbrances. See Maupin, Marketable
Title to Real Estate, § 203, p. 552 (2d ed. 1921).
45 Gwynne v. Goldware, 102 Neb. 260, 166 N.W. 625 (1918). See Annot.,
87 A.L.R. 1515 (1933).
46 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-104 (Reissue 1956).
47 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-101 (Reissue 1956).
48 See generally 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 368 (1941) for
common raw rule. In Crawl v. Harrington, 33 Neb. 107, 49 N.W. 1118
(1891), it was held before dower wag abolished that the wife received
no dower rights in equitable interests of deceased. In Cutler v. Meeker,
71 Neb. 722, 99 N.W. 514 (1904) also decided before dower was abolished,
it was held that equitable interests of deceased were alienable, de-
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Section 30-101 of the Nebraska statutes provides that the sur-
viving spouse's share may be taken against both legal and equi-
table properties of the deceased.
Where the full purchase price has been paid and the deceased
at the time of his death had a right to a conveyance of the land,
the weight of authority is that the wife may demand her statutory
share.49  However, it would seem equitable that if the deceased
purchaser possessed a lesser share at his death, the surviving
spouse should contribute a proportionate share toward the per-
formance of the contract before his or her rights may be enforced.
Some cases in other jurisdictions have adopted this rule.50
In the case of mortgages, Section 30-320 of the Nebraska stat-
utes provides that the deceased mortgagor's personal estate must
first be used to discharge indebtedness on the land.51. If the simi-
larities of the two security devices are accepted, this rule should
apply as well to the land contract situation by analogy. If the
note which accompanies a mortgage is a "debt" within the mean-
ing of the statute,52 then, the indebtedness represented by a land
contract also is a personal "debt" of the buyer. If this is true, the
surviving spouse would be entitled to receive his or her statutory
share in the land free of debt or at least under an arrangement
for the payment of the debt.
J. ASSIGNMENT
The principles in connection with assignment of contracts are
simple when the type of assignment is known. Three methods
are used. The first is a novation which involves a complete as-
scendible and devisable as if legal title were held. The Harrington
rule was confirmed in Grandjean v. Beyl, 78 Neb. 354, 114 N.W. 414,
15 Ann. Cas. 577 (1907) in spite of the Cutler case because it had become
a rule of property. For current cases indicating status of equitable
interests see Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954) and
Meck v. Wiig, 129 Neb. 746, 262 N.W. 829 (1933) where the court re-
garded the statutory interest as an enlargement over dower, a con-
tingent interest in the fee.
49 See Annot., 66 A.L.R. 65 (1930).
51) Hart v. Logan, 49 Mo. 46 (1846); Greenbaum v. Austrian, 70 Ill. 591
(1873).
5 1 Lienhart v. Conway, 146 Neb. 821, 21 N.W.2d 749 (1946) where it was
held that the deceased's personal estate must first be used to pay off
the debt of the mortgage when the deceased was personally liable on
the note.
5 2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-230 (Reissue 1956).
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signment by the assignor or by the party liable on the contract.
Here the promisor on the contract agrees to look only to the as-
signee for its performance and the effect is that a new contract has
been made. The second method is the same except that the promisor
does not release the assignor of liability. This type most fre-
quently occurs in refinancing land contracts. The third type
occurs when a buyer contracts to sell under another contract the
land he is buying on the first contract. He promises under the
terms of the later contract that he will acquire title and give his
deed to the subcontractor at the time set for performance. The
buyer under a subcontract can look only to his seller for perform-
ance, whereas if he claims by way of an assignment of the original
contract he also is entitled to performance from the original seller.
Because the law favors free alienability of land, prohibitions
contained in contracts against assignment are usually narrowly
construed. 3 Nebraska has held that where the assignee of a con-
tract has fully performed by payment to the seller, the assignee
was entitled to specific performance even though the contract
contained a provision that no assignment would be valid unless
assented to by the seller.54
1. Assignment by Vendee
It is generally held that a purchaser under a contract has an
interest that may be sold or transferred to another." He cannot,
however, create in another an interest greater than he has because
his interest is equitable, not legal, 6 and even though the assignee
assumes the obligations of the contract, the buyer is not relieved
of liability. 7  The seller, if sued by the assignee, may raise any
defenses thereto that he could raise against the assignor. Where
the assignee has performed the contract, he is entitled to bring a
suit of specific performance against the seller. 8 On the other hand,
doubt has been raised by some writers 'as to -whether, in the ab-
53 III American Law of Property, § 11.36, p. 105 (1952).
54 Wagner v. Cheney, 16 Neb. 202, 20 N.W. 222 (1884) where the court
allowed the plaintiff-assignee specific performance and note was made
of the fact that no penalty had been provided in case of assignment
and also that the plaintiff offered to secure the remainder of the debt
with a mortgage according to the terms of the contract.
55 Tierney v. Dietsch, 110 Neb. 462, 194 N.W. 475 (1923).
56 Gwynne v. Goldware, 102 Neb. 260, 166 N.W. 475 (1923).
,7 Pollard v. Laeson, 115 Neb. 136, 211 N.W. 998 (1927).
58 Wagner v. Cheney, 16 Neb. 202, 20 N.W. 222 (1884).
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sence of an assumption of the duty to pay under the contract, the
seller may enforce his rights against the assignee.5 9 Nebraska
has held that such obligations are deemed to be assumed in the
absence of express provisions.60 But where the original parties
have contracted for deferred payments, the assignee cannot re-
quire the vendor to accept his notes when it appears that it was
the security of the original vendee that was desired. 61
2. Assignment by Vendor
Ordinarily, the contract embodies the personal obligation of
the buyer to pay. Negotiable notes, such as those used in mortgage
transactions, are not used frequently. The vendor, holding both
the legal title and the contract, may by sale of the land or by as-
signment of the contract effectively transfer his interest to his
assignee. In either case, an assignee with notice stands in the
shoes of the original vendor in so far as the performance of the
contract is concerned. If the legal title to the land is not trans-
ferred to the assignee when the contract is assigned, the assignee
is entitled to have the land conveyed to him when the time for
performance of the contract arrives.6 2 The rights of a buyer or
assignee who purchases from the seller without notice of a prior
contract is discussed in the section concerning notice.
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
THE CONTRACT
The following subsections under this heading are concerned
with the contract's sufficiency in law and its enforceability against
a seller or against his assignee.
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The original English statute of frauds of 1677 was enacted to
prevent fraud and perjuries on landowners by persons who sought
to prove an effective contract or conveyance of land by anything
but written evidence of the agreement.6 3 Most states have stat-
ri III American Law of Property, § 11.38 (1952); Restatement, Contracts,
§ 164 (1932).
60 Murphy v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 57 Neb. 519, 77 N.W. 1102
(1899).
61 Rice v. Gibbs, 40 Neb. 264, 58 N.W. 724 (1894).
612 III American Law of Property, § 11.41 (1952).
63 Stat. 29 Car. II, C. 3 (1677); see also III American La of Property,
§ 11.3 (1952).
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utes that are similar and which can be traced to the original Eng-
lish statute. For the most part, Nebraska has preserved the sub-
stance of the English statute. Although the statute of frauds
embraces several different classes of oral transactions within its
prohibitions, one particular part is pertinent to this paper. It
states, "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale of any lands, shall be void unless the
contract or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and
signed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made."04
The several requirements which must be met in order to avoid the
operation of this statute are treated separately:
1. The Memorandum
No particular degree of formality is required in the execution
of a written agreement so long as it is signed by the seller 65 and
contains an adequate description of the land, identifies the buyer, 66
and states the price to be paid.67 The exact conditions of payment
need not be stated. 8 The contract may be entered into by a series
of correspondence so long as a definite offer and an unconditional
acceptance are ascertainable. 69 The contract is sufficient if no
specific time for performance is contained in the writings, and
the buyer need only comply within a reasonable time to be en-
titled to a decree of specific performance.70 Therefore, the re-
quirements of the statute are that the terms of the contract be
64 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-105 (Reissue 1952).
65 Smith v. Severn, 93 Neb. 148, 139 N.W. 858 (1913); Gartell v. Stafford,
12 Neb. 545, 11 N.W. 732 (1882); Campbell v. Kewanee Finance Co.,
133 Neb. 887, 277 N.W. 593 (1938); Ballou v. Sherwood, 32 Neb. 666,
49 N.W. 790 (1891); Robinson v. Cheney, 17 Neb. 673, 24 N.W. 378
(1885).
66 Barkhurst v. Nevins, 106 Neb. 33, 182 N.W. 563 (1921).
67 Frahm v. Metcalf, 75 Neb. 241, 106 N.W. 227 (1905); McWilliams
v. Lawless, 15 Neb. 131, 17 N.W. 349 (1883); Collyer v. Davis, 72
Neb. 887, 101 N.W. 1001 (1904).
68 Ruzicka v. Hotovy, 72 Neb. 589, 101 N.W. 328 (1904).
69 Pottratz v. Piper, 95 Neb. 145, 145 N.W. 265 (1914); Shoff v. Ash,
95 Neb. 255, 145 N.W. 271 (1914); O'Shea v. Smith, 142 Neb. 231,
5 N.W.2d 348 (1942). A definite offer and an unconditional accept-
ance must be ascertainable from the correspondence. Horn v. Stuckey,
146 Neb. 625, 20 N.W.2d 692 (1945); Mercer v. Payne & Sons Co.,
115 Neb. 420, 213 N.W. 813 (1927); Alexander v. Turner, 139 Neb.
364, 297 N.W. 589 (1941); Glgren v. Price, 140 Neb. 124, 299 N.W.
325 (1941).
70 Iske v. Iske, 95 Neb. 603, 146 N.W. 918 (1914).
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fairly determinable from the writing or writings in order to avoid
the statutory bar.
2. Part Performance
Most often, sellers seek to have a court of equity apply the
statute as a bar to an action of specific performance by buyers. For
example, buyers who have purchased land by oral contract usually
seek to have the court compel the seller to convey the land. If
other relief such as damages will adequately compensate the buyer,
specific performance is unavailable to him.7 1 In many cases, how-
ever, possession is the fairest possible relief to the buyer who has
contracted to purchase land in good faith. Therefore, because of
frauds that would result through use of the statute as an absolute
bar to relief, certain exceptions to its operation have developed
and some contracts are enforced even though there is no written
memorandum of the agreement. A Nebraska statute provides:
"Nothing contained in . . . [the preceding] . . . sections shall be
construed to abridge the powers of a court of equity to compel the
specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance." 72
Courts have utilized several tests which are helpful in applying
this statute but. those tests certainly are not to be exclusively
relied upon in this litigious area of law.
a. Solely Referable Rule
In Overlander v. Ware,73 the court stated, "The thing done
constituting performance, must be such as is referable solely to the
contract sought to be enforced, and not such as might be referable
to some other and different contract-something that the claimant
would not have done unless on account of the agreement and with
the direct view to its performance-so that nonperformance by
the other party would amount to fraud upon him.' 74 Later, in
Baker v. .eavrin, 75 a buyer was denied specific performance when
he showed as part performance acts of purchasing tools for use on
the purchased land and obtaining a loan. The court stated that
these acts did not refer to the performance contemplated under
this contract. This rule was applied in numerous other cases in
71 Anderson v. Anderson, 150 Neb. 879, 36 N.W.2d 287 (1949).
72 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-106 (Reissue 1952).
73 102 Neb. 216, 166 N.W. 611 (1918).
74 Overlander v. Ware, 102 Neb. 216, 218, 166 N.W. 611, 612 (1918).
75 148 Neb. 766, 29 N.W.2d 375 (1947).
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denying relief so that at one time it could be said that unless all
of the acts done by a buyer or grantee were explicable as perform-
ance of the conditions of the contract rather than some other re-
lationship no relief would be granted.7 6  The rule was eased in
Riley v. Riley, where the court said, ". . . the fact that there may
be adversary evidence indicating that the acts refer to some other
contract or situation will not defeat this satisfaction of the rule. '77
Presently, it is thought by some writers that the former harshness
of the Nebraska rule has been eased by recent cases7 8 and the
statute restored to its function of preventing frauds on buyers.
b. Payment of the Purchase Price
* Generally, payment of the purchase price alone without other
acts of performance by the buyer is not sufficient 79 because the
buyer has an adequate remedy at law to recover payments made.
Something more than mere payment of the purchase price there-
fore must be shown before a court of equity will grant specific
performance. Specific performance has been granted in Nebraska
in cases where the buyer under a contract had fully performed
and the seller had delivered possession."
3. Possession
A particularly difficult problem arises when a tenant in possession
of the land orally contracts with his landlord to purchase this land
76 Taylor v. Clark, 143 Neb. 563, 10 N.W.2d 495 (1943); Crnkovich v.
Crnkovich, 144 Neb. 905, 15 N.W.2d 66 (1944); Caspers v. Frerichs,
146 Neb. 740, 21 N.W.2d 513 (1946). See also Smith v. Kinsey,
148 Neb. 786, 28 N.W.2d 588 (1947); but compare Herbstreith v.
Walls, 147 Neb. 805, 25 N.W.2d 375 (1947) where specific performance
was granted after the plaintiff had proved an unsigned contract
for the purchase of the land and part performance by him within
its ternis. In this case, however, plaintiff had little difficulty in
proving a contract.
77 150 Neb. 176, 183, 33 N.W.2d 525, 529 (1948).
78 Lake, Selected Problems in Contract Liability, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 1
(1952). See also Teft, The Doctrine of Part Performance in Nebraska,
7 Neb. L. Bul. 327 (1929); Note, 27 Neb. L. Rev. 417 (1948), and
Nebraska State Bar Association Proceedings in 28 Neb. L. Rev.
231 (1949).
79 Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243, 74 N.W. 569 (1898);
Riddell v. Riddell, 70 Neb. 472, 97 N.W. 709 (1903); Barkhurst v.
Nevins, 106 Neb. 33, 182 N.W. 563 (1921); Herring v. Whitford, 119
Neb. 724, 230 N.W. 665 (1930).
so Morrison v. Gosnell, 76 Neb. 539, 196 N.W. 753 (1906); Lipp v. Hunt,
25 Neb. 91, 41 N.W. 143 (1888).
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because the tenant in this situation must show actions in addition
to possession which are more consistant with a contract of purchase
than with a tenancy. Former holdings of the Nebraska Supreme
Court based on the "solely referable" rule indicated such a con-
tract would be impossible to prove.81 In a recent case, however,
a tenant in possession obtained relief on his oral contract to pur-
chase when he proved he had paid amounts greater than the pre-
vious rent and also had paid insurance and taxes which as a tenant
he would not be required to do.8 2
4. Improvements
Specific performance is often granted to a buyer who has
made improvements on the land because damages would not ade-
quately compensate him for his time and effort. Improvements
which are consistent with a buyer's possession under a contract
are usually those of a permanent nature such as buildings and last-
ing improvements on structures.8 3 It has been held that when the
value of improvements exceeds the value of the land specific per-
formance will be granted;8- and also that recovery may be had by
persons who improve land and rely upon promises that it will be
given them if they remain on and work the land until the death
of the promisor or some other event.8 5
B. NOTICE AND THE RECORDING ACTS
In this subsection, consideration is given to the effect of notice
to third parties of the transaction. Between the buyer dind seller,
31 Steger v. Kosch, 77 Neb. 147, 108 N.W. 165 (1906); Lewis v. North,
62 Neb. 552, 87 N.W. 312 (1901); Schields v. Harbach, 49 Neb. 262,
68 N.W. 524 (1896) where possession by a tenant under a contract
to purchase was held insufficient to constitute part performance to
take it out of the statute of frauds. See also Crnkovich V. Crnkovich,
144 Neb. 904, 15 N.W.2d 66 (1944).
82 Herbstreith v. Walls, 147 Neb. 805, 25 N.W.2d 409 (1946).
s3 Campbell v. Kewanee Finance Co., 133 Neb. 887, 277 N.W. 593 (1938)
where in addition to painting the barn and planting crops, the
vendee fertilized the soil and leveled a barrow pit.
.4 Coleridge Creamery Co. v. Jenkins, 66 Neb. 129, 92 N.W. 123 (1902).
s Hackbarth v. Hackbarth, 146 Neb. 919, 22 N.W.2d 184 (1946), where
the grantee was entitled to a conveyance only after clear, satisfactory
and unequivocal proof of agreement. But see Merriman v. Merriman,
75 Neb. 222, 106 N.W. 174 (1905) where proof was held insufficient;
Garner v. McCrea, 147 Neb. 541, 23 N.W.2d 731 (1946); but compare
Wlaschin v. Affleck, 167 Neb. 403, - N.W.2d - (1958) where a
buyer was granted damages for improvements made after an oral
contract.
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recordation of the contract is not important, but where third parties
have acquired or subsequently acquire liens on the land, such as
mechanics liens, other mortgages, judgments or even other con-
tracts of sale, recordation is important to protect the priority of
the buyer's equity.
Generally, a buyer in good faith, having no actual or con-
structive notice of liens or equitable rights of third persons in the
land, is protected against prior unrecorded interests in the land.
In order to become a buyer in good faith, he must not have been
notified of outstanding encumbrances prior to the sale through
(1) actual knowledge of other liens; (2) facts which would cause
a reasonable man to investigate further; (3) a search of the records
or constructive notice.
The Nebraska notice statute is a "race-notice" type enactment
which has been adopted by a minority of other jurisdictions.86
Under this statute, the buyer or other lienholder must record his
interest before other interests are recorded.8 7  In other words,
he must "race" to the record to record first. The time of execution
of the instrument or attachment of the lien is unimportant unless
it is recorded if subsequent parties have no notice of these interests.
The Nebraska statute provides that all interests, including land
contracts, must be recorded in the county where the land is located
in order to be protected against subsequent recorded interests.""
A recordable interest in land embraces every conveyance by which
real estate may be "aliened, mortgaged or assigned, or by which
the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except
last wills and leases for one year or for less time."89 The term
"real estate" embraces all lands, tenements, and hereditaments,
including chattels real, but not including leases for less than a
year.90
If the buyer does not search the records, he nevertheless is held
to have knowledge of -all recorded interests therein which are
entitled to be recorded. The buyer need only notice however those
interests of record which are traceable to the title of the seller.0 1
86 IV American Law of Property, § 17.5, p. 545, note 63 (1952).
87 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-238 (Reissue 1950).
88 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-211 (Reissue 1950).
89 Nb. Rev. Stat. § 76-203 (Reissue 1950).
90 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-201 (Reissue 1950).
91 Traphagen v. Irwin, 18 Neb. 195, 24 N.W. 684 (1885); Weatherington
v. Smith, 77 Neb. 303, 109 N.W. 164 aff'd 77 Neb. 369, 112 N.W.
566 (1906).
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Thus, a recorded interest of one whose grantor did not record will
not be valid against the buyer who could not discover it in the
chain of his own seller's title. Where the buyer has assumed a
mortgage on the land, he may rely on the debt and due date of
record and need not inquire further.9 2 The record must show the
land to which the interest attaches. A failure to close the bound-
aries in the description of the land so that a complete tract was
not described was held not to furnish adequate notice of a .prior
equity.9 3
A recorded mortgage -or other interest should be released of
record to clear title. This is done either by writing the release on
the margin of the record94 or by recording a certificate of discharge
signed by the mortgagee.9 5
In addition to searching the record the buyer must not have
actual notice of existing encumbrances on the land. Possession of
the land by persons other than the seller is notice to the buyer of
whatever rights that person possesses in the land, even though
he has taken possession by an unrecorded document. The buyer
is also bound to know facts which a reasonable inquiry would
elicit. When a house is purchased, possession by one other than
the seller is not difficult to ascertain, but with unimproved land
possession is not so easily ascertainable. The question whether
there is possession or not is a question of fact 9 6 and the circum-
stances must appear so suspicious as to put a reasonably prudent
man upon inquiry.9 7 It has been held that placing a fence around
the land and grazing cattle upon it was sufficient to show posses-
sion. 8 Also, where a prior conveyance of land by the seller was
mistakenly recorded but actually conveyed the land being pur-
chased, it was held that the buyer could not prevail.9 9 On the
other hand, where the circumstances do not show that the land
is possessed by another through a reasonable inspection, the good
92 Stewart v. Walker, 80 Neb. 68, 113 N.W. 814 (1907).
93 Gillespie v. Sawyer, 15 Neb. 536, 19 N.W. 44.9 (1883).
94 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-252 (Reissue 1950).
95 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-253 (Reissue 1950).
90 Laughlin v. Garniner, 104 Neb. 237, 176 N.W. 727 modified 104
Neb. 237 (1920).
97 Miller v. Vanicek, 106 Neb. 661, 184 N.W. 132 (1921).
98 Millard v. Wegner, 68 Neb. 574, 94 N.W. 802 (1903); Lyon v. Gombert,
63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).
99 Miller v. Vanicek, supra, note 97.
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faith of the buyer has been upheld.100 When actual knowledge of
another interest is had before the entire purchase price is paid,
the buyer is not a bona fide purchaser to the extent of the payment
remaining. 01
An abstracter is usually employed to compile the recorded in-
terests against the land for the parties. He warrants either to one
or both parties that the abstract contains all of the recorded inter-
ests affecting the land up to the present transaction. If he has
failed to find all of these interests through his own negligence,
he is liable on his warranty. 0 2
Once a document is recorded, the owner of that interest is
protected. A subsequent destruction of the records, 0 3 the failure
of the clerk to record'0 4 or the act of the clerk in recording wrong-
ly'0 5 will not deprive the recording party from the protection of
the statutes as constructive notice to all who subsequently deal
with the land.
C. JOINT TENANCis AND TENANciEs IN CoMMoN
Joint tenancies and tenancies in common are considered at
this point to illustrate the effect of a land contract on these types
of land tenure. 00 For purposes of illustration, assume that A and
B are brothers, single and hold land jointly by a deed from their
father as "joint tenants with right of survivorship." C wishes to
purchase this land from A and B. What must C know? A true
joint tenancy exists when four unities of ownership are present
equally in two or more persons. It is defined as "An estate . ..
created in two or more persons at the same time by the same con-
veyance, and the holders of such an estate must be given an equal
and like interest therein and be given equal and like right to the
possession of the corpus of the estate. That there must be a unity
100 Bowhay v. Richards, 81 Neb. 764, 116 N.W. 677 (1908); Hunt v.
Lipp, 30 Neb. 469, 46 N.W. 632 (1890); Ensign v. Citizens' Interurban
Ry., 92 Neb. 363, 138 N.W. 718 (1912).
101 Birdsa11 v. Cropsey, 29 Neb. 672, 44 N.W. 857, modified, 29 Neb. 679,
45 N.W. 921 (1890); see also Frerking v. Thomas, 64 Neb. 193, 89
N.W. 1005 (1902).
102 Crook v. Chilvers, 99 Neb. 684, 157 N.W. 617 (1916).
103 Deming v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892).
104 Perkins v. Strong, 22 Neb. 725, 36 N.W. 292 (1888).
105 Powers v. Spiedel, 184 Neb. 630, 121 N.W. 968 (1909).
106 34 Neb. Law Rev. 280 (1954).
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of possession, a unity of interest, a unity of time and a unity of
title in the holders of such an estate in order for it to exist. .... 1o0
If one or more of these unities is destroyed, the right of survivor-
ship ceases and a tenancy in common results.
Thus, a tenancy in common may arise "where two or more
hold the same land, with interest accruing under different titles,
or accruing under the same title, but at different periods, or con-
ferred by words of limitation importing that the grantees are to
take in distinct shares."' 0 8 When A and B, the joint tenants, sign
the contract to sell this land and deliver possession the unities
of possession, interest and title are destroyed because of the doc-
trine of equitable conversion and thus the survivorship feature is
also destroyed. 0 9 Some consequences of this are: (1) if A or B
should die, C must make his payments half to the survivor and
the other half to the personal representative of the deceased seller
and (2) if A and B regain possession by rescission or C's default,
a new deed to recreate the joint tenancy may be required.
If either A or B had contracted singly to sell his interest, the
survivorship feature would also be destroyed because the char-
acteristic of a true joint tenancy is that any one of the tenants can
destroy the survivorship feature by destroying one of the unities.
It has been said, although no Nebraska case has so decided,
that the act of all joint tenants in mortgaging property would not
destroy the joint tenancy, whereas the act of one joint tenant in
mortgaging would sever the joint tenancy." 0 This is probably
explicable in that where all joint tenants mortgage, the unity of
interest remains the same, but where one mortgages, his interest
in relation to the other co-owners is changed. Also, the doctrine
of equitable conversion does not apply to mortgages.
Where land is purchased from sellers who are joint tenants,
it is important to specify in the contract whether the survivorship
107 Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 377, 297 N.W. 595, 597 (1941).
10-8 Jones v. Shrigley, 150 Neb. 137, 147, 33 N.W.2d 510, 516 (1949).
109 Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954). Although
technically the unity of possession is destroyed, it may be doubted
whether this is correct, for a joint tenancy can also be had in personal
property and by equitable conversion, the joint tenants would have
equal substituted rights in the purchase money. On the rationale
of this case, if a contract were signed without surrendering possession,
equitable conversion would still cause the joint tenancy to be severed.
See for an excellent discussion of this case and similar cases in otherjurisdictions, Comment, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 108 (1959).
110 See 34 Neb. Law Rev. 292 (1954).
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feature is to control payments made after the death of one of the
sellers.
D. MISTAKE AN INCAPACITY
At the time a contract is made certain requirements must be
met; otherwise, the agreement is invalid. The contract must not
be for an illegal purpose;"' there must be no honest mistake as to
the important features of the agreement; 1 2 and the parties must
be legally competent. A child must have reached his majority
before he has capacity to make other than a voidable contract 13
or be represented by a guardian.1 4 Under the common law a
woman's capacity to bind her own property by contract was not
recognized,1 6 but to a large extent this has been rectified by en-
abling acts so that now a married woman can contract,"'; sue and
be sued almost to the same extent as if she were a man. 17 The
above features of contract law are usually well understood and
applied so that little conflict arises over them.
E. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
A cheated man is not bound by his contract. If the seller
causes the buyer to rely to his detriment upon false representations,
then the buyer may be allowed restitution. In seeking to rescind
the buyer cannot accept any benefits under the contract and must
deny its force as a binding, agreement.""' Because a comprehensive
discussion of this subject requires an analysis of the law of fraud,
deceit and torts as well as some statutory authority, no extended
treatment is presented here.
11 See generally, III American Law of Property, § 11.21, p. 59 et seq.
(1952).
112 Goger v. Voecks, 156 Neb. 696, 57 N.W.2d 621 (1953).
113 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-101 (Reissue 1952).
114 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-601 (Reissue 1952).
115 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-201 et seq. (Reissue 1952).
116 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-202 (Reissue 1952). See also Marmet v. Marmet,
160 Neb. 366, 70 N.W.2d 301 (1955).
17 Ginsburg, Contractual Liability of Married Women in Nebraska, 20
Neb. L. Rev. 191 (1941); Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-305, 306 (Reissue 1952).
118 See for an excellent statement of the rule, Wolford v. Freeman,
350 Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98 (1948).
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F. DEED OF TRUST AND POWER OF SALE
In some jurisdictions, the deed of trust is used as a security
device. Under this arrangement a deed is delivered to a trustee to
hold it subject to the conditions of the trust instrument and to
receive payments from the buyer. If the buyer defaults, the trustee
is empowered to sell the property extra-judicially for the benefit
of the seller and in this way to avoid the process of judicial fore-
closure. The chief advantage of deeds of trust, the extra-judicial
sale, is not recognized in Nebraska." 9
Similarly, powers of sale in a mortgage which purport to em-
power the mortgagee to sell extra-judicially, are invalid. 20 The
Nebraska cases consistently adhere to the rule that every con-
veyance absolute upon its face, when shown to a court of equity
to be a security transaction, must be treated as a mortgage and
foreclosed as such.1 1 Thus, in Nebraska, no unfair advantage
can be obtained by a seller of land by use of extra-judicial powers
of sale.
G. MORTGAGE BY DEED ABSOLUTE
A mortgage by deed absolute, except for bona fide purchasers,
also comes to naught in the equity court. Between the parties,
when it is shown that a deed absolute on its face was given with
the intention only to secure a debt rather than to convey the land
described the deed is a mortgage. In other words, passage of title
is disregarded when it has been given as security. A Nebraska
119 At IV American Law of Property, p. 496, § 16204, note 14, "Durfee
could find only one state (Neb.) in which the power of sale is
judicially nullified. See also Kirkendall v. Weatherby, 77 Neb. 421,
109 N.W. 757, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 515 (1906); Cullen v. Casey, 1 Neb.
(Unof.) 344, 95 N.W. 605 (1901)."
120 Fiske v. Mayhew, 90 Neb. 196, 133 N.W. 195 (1911) where in citing
Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. .308, the "court stated, "The fact that the
mortgage in this instance is in the form of a deed of trust does not
change its character from a mere security for the payment of money,
nor does it convey the legal title nor do the restrictions therein con
tained prevent the plaintiff from availing herself of the safeguards
thrown around the debtor to prevent a sacrifice of her property." See
also Hurley v. Estes, 6 Neb. 386 (1877), where an instrument given as
security is a mortgage no matter what its form and must be judicially
foreclosed.
121 Wheeler v. Sexton, 34 Fed. 154 (1888) where it was stated that the
mortgagee's sole remedy is by judicial foreclosure. See also deed
of trust cases, Kyger v. Ryley, 2 Neb. 20 (1873), Comstock v. Michael,
17 Neb. 298, 22 N.W. 549 (1885).
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statute declares: "Every deed conveying real estate, which, by
any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been in-
tended only as security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be
an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a mort-
gage. .... - Ordinarily, a deed passes the title to the grantee,
but where the deed is accompanied by a defeasance in writing,
the two instruments are construed as the equivalent of a mort-
gage.1 23 The grantor can sell the land to another and give good
title. The grantee, or mortgagee, cannot gain any advantage from
recording his deed, unless the defeasance is recorded at the same
time.1 24 It can be seen from cases in this and the preceding sec-
tions that little advantage can be gained from calling a security
transaction anything but a mortgage.
IV. MORTGAGES
This article is concerned with the law of mortgages only as
it is applicable to installment land contracts, and therefore the
rights and liabilities of parties to a mortgage are not discussed at
great length; and it should be emphasized that in any discussion
of mortgages much depends upon the terms of the instrument.
If the rights and duties are not set forth in the mortgage, the con-
trolling factor is title to the land. This is in the mortgagor. There-
fore in the absence of expression, most of the duties of ownership
such as upkeep of the land are on the buyer.
The mortgage relationship results from a transfer of title to the
buyer who in turn executes a mortgage to either the seller or to
a third party creditor. The latter becomes the mortgagee and is
vested with a legal lien, usually a first lien, on the land. The
salient features are that the seller gives up both title and possession
but in a court of equity, the movement of title is disregarded once
a security relationship is proven. What the court sees is that each
party has substantial equitable rights in the land. The mortgagee
122 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 (Reissue 1950).
123 Ashbrook v. Briner, 137 Neb. 104, 288 N.W. 374 (1939); Campbell v.
Ohio Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956) where the
Ashbrook case was approved and followed.
124 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 (Reissue 1950). The last sentence reads,
"and the person for whose benefit such deed shall be made shall
not derive any advantage from the recording thereof, unless every
writing operating as a defeasance of the same or explanatory of its
being designed to have the effect only of a mortgage or conditional
deed, be also recorded therewith and at the same time." This statute
is discussed in Note, 28 Neb. L. Rev. 481 (1949).
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has a mortgage lien which represents a security interest. The
mortgagor has an equity of redemption-the right to purchase or
pay past due payments until foreclosure. It is this equity of re-
demption that is foreclosed upon default. When the divergencies
of mortgage and land contract law are discussed, the foremost
feature is the difference between foreclosure by judicial sale and
strict foreclosure. The law requires mortgages to be foreclosed
by judicial sale. Land contracts may be similarly foreclosed at
the election of the seller. On the other hand, strict foreclosure of
land contracts is permissible only under certain conditions. Per-
haps it is proper to speak of foreclosure also as the presence or
absence of an equity of redemption.
A. THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCESS jN NEBRASKA
In the usual mortgage relationship, the mortgagee has a first
mortgage on the land together with a negotiable promissory note of
the same date signed by the mortgagor. The note represents the
debt which is the principal obligation. When it is extinguished,
the mortgage is automatically extinguished.
Mortgage foreclosures in Nebraska are governed by statute
and a judicial sale is the exclusive way by which the mortgagor's
equities or rights in the land may be cut off. Any attempt by the
mortgagee outside this statutory procedure to sell the land and
recover his money is void. 125 This .is true even when the parties
have agreed by the terms of the mortgage for a different disposi-
tion in case of default for insertion of clauses in the mortgage
which cut off the mortgagor's rights without court action is a clog
on the equity of redemption and void. An instance of this type
is found in the sections concerning powers of sale and deeds of
trust. Another type of clogging the equity of redemption is strict
foreclosure which occurs whenever the mortgagee may by the
terms of the instrument or by permission of the court enter the
land, seize possession, and declare the mortgagor's interest for-
feited and the contract at an end. Strict foreclosure does not in-
volve a sale but only forfeiture and repossession by the seller.
It is allowed today in varying forms in a minority of states but
then only with certain limitations.126
125 Supra, notes 90, 91, and 92.
126 See generally, IV American Law of Property, § 16.179 (1952); I Glenn,
Mortgages, § 59 (1943).
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1. Stay of Foreclosure
Upon application by the mortgagor within 20 days after the
decree of foreclosure, 127 the court's decree ordering sale of the
premises is stayed for nine months.128  Where a land installment
contract is foreclosed as a mortgage a nine months stay is given
the buyer. 129 However, if strict foreclosure of a land contract is
granted by the court the stay of sale will not be granted. 1 3 1 It
should be noted that at the election of the seller land installment
contracts are foreclosed as mortgages under certain circumstances
because the seller wishes a later action for the deficiency rather
than just to regain possession of the land.
Nebraska requires the mortgagee on default to elect whether
he will sue on the debt or foreclose against the land. By electing
to foreclose he has selected his remedy and cannot have judgment
against the mortgagor in the same suit for any deficiency between
the sale price of the land and the amount of the debt. 13 1 But later
suit is allowed for this deficiency 132 although serious doubt exists
that this interpretation of the statute was ever intended by the
legislature.133
The model foreclosure action is actually an additional stay of
sale in itself because it is lengthy and time-consuming.' 3 4  After
payment of costs, the proceeds of the sale go first to the mortgagee
to the extent of his debt and then to other lienholders according
to priority. The remainder belongs to the mortgagor. The mort-
gagee may sue on the note if the whole or a .portion of it is due
127 Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n. v. Phillips, 124 Neb. 672, 247
N.W. 600 (1933) where it was held that no excuses for failure to
request stay would be allowed. See also Jenkins Land & Live Stock
Co. v. Attwood, 80 Neb. 806, 115 N.W. 305 (1908) where it was held that
a sale made within nine months period was void and no title passed.
128 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1506 (Reissue 1956).
129 Spencer v. Moyer, 29 Neb. 305, 45 N.W. 464 (1890); Hawkins v. Mullen,
119 Neb. 567, 230 N.W. 252 (1930).
130 Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893).
131 Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 857, 290 N.W. 440 (1940).
132 Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1904).
1A3 20 Neb. Law Rev. 70 (1941). See also "One Action Rule", IV American
Law of Property, § 16.201 (1952); I Glenn, Mortgages, § 96, p. 597 (1943).
These articles challenge the reasons for requiring two separate actions
instead of one. It is pointed out that to require two actions is merely to
twice harass the debtor for the same thing.
134 See IV American Law of Property, § 16.185, p. 446 (1952).
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and owing. This suit does not destroy the mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship even if the mortgaged property is attached but merely
results in a money judgment.
The foreclosure suit must be brought in the county where the
land is situated.13 5 The petition must identify the land, the amount
of the debt, and request the land be sold. The court has the power
to decree the sale of all or a part of the land, whichever is necessary
to discharge the amount due on the mortgage. 3 6 When it is found
that the debt is in substantial default and that the stay of fore-
closure has either been waived or has expired, the court decrees
foreclosure and orders the sale. The decree is actually a judgment
for the debt which must be satisfied from the proceeds of the
sale. Because a foreclosure action is equitable, there is no right
to a determination of the facts by a jury.13 7
2. The Sale
The arrangements for the sale as to the person who is to con-
duct it, the place, the time and notice must be technically correct.
For example, the sale must be made by the sheriff unless some
other person is designated by the court,138 and a special master,
appointed to make the. sale, must make it. He cannot delegate
that authority. 139 The place of sale is the courthouse and a sale
from any door is permissible without stipulating it in the notice.'
40
The time of sale is determined by the mortgagee and must be con-




The mortgagee may bid at the sale 42 and thus protect his
interest at least to the extent of his lien.' 43 If the mortgagee should
135 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2137 (Reissue 1956).
136 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2138 (Reissue 1956).
137 Dold v. Munson, 107 Neb. 501, 186 N.W. 353 (1922).
138 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2144 (Reissue 1956).
139 Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Bldg. Co., 54 Neb. 228, 74
N.W. 583 (1898).
140 Peck v. Starks, 64 Neb. 341, 89 N.W. 1040 (1902). See also Bowman
v. Caldwell, 135 Neb. 554, 283 N.W. 194 (1939) where decree stated
"east front door" and the sale actually took place inside the court-
house within 30 of the door it was held a valid sale.
141 Gross v. Leidech, 63 Neb. 420, 88 N.W. 667 (1902).
142 Stover v. Stark, 61 Neb. 374, 258 N.W. 466 (1901).
1-3 See generally, I Glenn, Mortgages, § 94.1, p. 586 (1943).
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be the highest bidder the owner or mortgagor may redeem and
thus protect his interest. Theoretically this is good but as a prac-
tical matter the mortgagor is seldom able to do so.
4. 'Redemption and Confirmation
The officer who sells the land must report to the court the
results of the sale. The court then examines all relevant facts
pertaining to the sale and when satisfied that it has taken place
according to law and that a subsequent sale would not bring a
larger amount, the court confirms it.' 4 4 The owner's right to
redeem continues until the court has done this. If the owner re-
deems from the mortgagee, he must pay him the amount due on
the note, not just the amount of the mortgagee's bid. 145 This rule,
of course, protects the mortgagee and discourages redemption from
him where he has purchased the land for less than the amount
due him. When the owner redeems from a purchaser who is not
a party to the suit, he need only pay the sale price.146 The pur-
chaser of the land or the mortgagee need not accept redemption of
only a part interest by a co-tenant, but may demand that he pay
the entire amount of the debt. Also, a co-tenant of a tenancy in
common must hold the redeemed land for the other tenants sub-
ject to payment of their proportionate share of the debt.14 7
The right to redeem continues until after the court has con-
firmed the sale and the Supreme Court has heard the appeal.1 48
Generally, the court will not reverse a confirmation of sale unless
the sale price is low enough to shock the conscience of the court or
to evidence fraud.149 This encourages fair and competitive bidding
at .sales and upholds bids honestly made under normal circum-
stances.
144 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1531 (Reissue 1956).
145 Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903).
146 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1530 (Reissue 1956).
147 Dougherty v. Kubat, supra, note 145.
148 Philadelphia Co. v. Gustus, 55 Neb. 435, 75 N.W. 1107 (1898).
149 Forsythe v. Bermel, 138 Neb. 802, 295 N.W. 693 (1941); Lemere v.
White, 122 Neb. 676, 241 N.W. 105 (1932); Lindberg v. Tolle, 121 Neb.
25, 235 N.W. 670 (1931); Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763, 266 N.W.
577 (1936); Lincoln Nat. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 138 Neb. 741, 295 N.W.
282 (1940).
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V. STRICT FORECLOSURE OF LAND CONTRACTS
IN NEBRASKA
As already pointed out, the mortgagee usually has two remedies
when the mortgagor defaults. He may sue on the debt or fore-
close the mortgage. On the other hand in the law of land con-
tracts, the seller in addition to these two remedies may rescind the
contract, sue for specific performance, 150 or seek strict foreclosure.
If the seller chooses to foreclose by judicial sale, little distinction
can be made between the two security devices. It has long been
a rule in Nebraska that where a contract is foreclosed as a mort-
gage the seller's remedy is not confined solely to the proceeds
received from the sale of the land and that a deficiency judgment
may be had later.' 15 The only distinction between land contracts
and mortgage foreclosures is that a plaintiff in a suit to foreclose
a land contract need not allege that no action has previously been
had for the debt. Such an allegation is required when mortgages
are foreclosed. 52 The factor governing mortgage foreclosure suits
is not damages but the amount of the debt owing to the mortgagee.
If a seller under a land contract wishes strict foreclosure, he
must seek permission of a court of equity. Permission will be
granted or withheld depending upon the following considerations:
A. WHERE VALUE OF LAND is LEss THAN THE AMOUNT DUE
UNDER THE CONRACT
This rule is merely a short cut to judicial sale for when the
court determines that the present value of the land will not satisfy
the seller's equity, then little can be gained by having a judicial
sale. 154 The principal case involved a buyer equity of $15,00 as
compared to the remaining amount due under the contract of
$29,000. The court determined that the land would bring but
15o Colson v. Johnson's Estate, 111 Neb. 773, 197 N.W. 674, 35 A.L.R.
924 (1924).
151 Hendrix v. Barker, 49 Neb. 369, 68 N.W. 531 (1896) where plaintiff
elected to foreclose as a mortgage and claim later deficiency judgment
it was held that the vendee-defendant could not have a decree of
strict foreclosure. See also Gardels v. Kloke, 3.6 Neb. 493, 54 N.W.
832 (1893); Dorsey v. Hall, 7 Neb. 460 (1878).
152 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Leahy, 125 Neb. 644, 251 N.W.
278 (1934).
153 See Vanneman, "Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts", 14 Minn.
Law Rev. 359 (1930).
154 Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945).
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$24,000 at a judicial sale and as this would not satisfy the seller's
recovery under judicial sale, the court declared that strict fore-
closure was proper. But strict foreclosure has been denied when
the value of land increases after execution of the contract.1 55
B. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
In Stroble v. Smith, 50 the Nebraska Supreme Court granted
strict foreclosure when it determined that the rental value lost
by the vendor during the contract period was approximately the
same amount as the buyer's paid-in equity. The court considered
also that the present value of the land was $3,400.00 compared
with $3,951.62 remaining unpaid on the contract.
Throughout the cases granting strict foreclosure, it is repeated
that "courts of equity will decree a strict foreclosure of land con-
tracts only under peculiar and special circumstances, and that
applications of that character are addressed to the sound legal dis-
cretion of the court", and they are granted only in cases where
it would be inequitable and unjust to refuse them.1 57
The courts dislike forfeitures'5 and will avoid them if they
tend to be penalties rather than liquidated damages. As already
stated, the parties are denied the right to contract in such a way as
to disguise a security transaction. This denial extends notably
to attempts to "clog the equity of redemption" or to bring about
extra-judicial sale. But can the parties contract in such a way as
to bring about forfeiture or strict foreclosure without a court fore-
closure proceeding governed by those equitable considerations that
previously guided a court of equity? The answer is unsettled
except for several cases which must be discussed in detail.
C. FORFEITURE BY CONTRACT
In Ruhl v. Johnson, S, the owner, contracted to sell real estate
to B for $38,000.00. The contract provided for a down payment of
155 Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Thornberg, 54 Neb. 782, 75 N.W. 45 (1898).
156 131 Neb. 291, 267 N.W. 326 (1936).
157 Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893). See also
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Thornburg, 54 Neb. 712, 75
N.W. 45 (1898); Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 125 N.W. 1104
(1910); Grove v. Dineen, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 722, 96 N.W. 253 (1903);
Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945).
158 Adler v. Kohn, 96 Neb. 346, 147 N.W. 1131 (1914); Plummer v. Fie,
167 Neb. 367, - N.W.2d - (1958).
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$12,000 and monthly payments of $256.46. B paid a total of $17,385
before defaulting and was $2,194.00 behind in payments when a
strict foreclosure suit was commenced. The Nebraska Supreme
Court denied strict foreclosure because of B's large equity in the
land.1 9 In a later action,160 S obtained possession of the premises
from B by a writ of assistance. B then brought suit against S and
sought restitution and damages for withholding possession. The
court denied both remedies to B because by the terms of the con-
tract, S, not B, was entitled to possession. Thus damages were not
allowed unless B had a right to possession which he did not have by
the terms of the contract. The rule which allowed a buyer to re-
cover from a seller for rents and profits received when the seller
was in possession was held available only in proceedings to foreclose
or redeem. The buyer could not redeem and could not demand
foreclosure and it was clear that he could have neither rents and
profits nor possession until he did redeem.
It should be noted that the principal case did not foreclose the
buyer's equity of redemption, or at least it did not profess to do so.
Thus theoretically at least, the buyer never loses his equity of re-
demption and that right will remain a cloud on the seller's title.
The probability of B's redeeming, however, becomes more negli-
gible with the passage of time. The case holds, however, that
unless B was entitled to possession of the premises under the con-
tract, he will be denied relief. In short, redemption was his sole
remedy which he obviously could not do.
D. EJECTMENT
In Abbass v. Demont,1 1' the buyer contracted to buy land from
the seller for $8,950.00. The buyer defaulted after paying $2,143.80.
The seller sought ejectment under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2124162 and
159 Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951).
160 Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb. 330, 75 N.W.2d 717 (1956).
101 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949); accord, Johnson v. Norton, 152
Neb. 714, 42 N.W.2d 622 (1950).
102 "In an action for the recovery of real property, it shall be sufficient
if the plaintiff states in his petition that he has a legal estate therein
and is entitled to the possession thereof, describing the same, and
that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of possession. It shall
not be necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is
derived." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2124 (Reissue 1956). See also Dysart,
Foreclosures in Nebraska, § 187 (a) and cases collected therein for
distinction between actions for ejectment and quiet title. See Worth-
ington v. Woods, 22 Neb. 230, 34 N.W. 368 (1887) where it was held
that the action of forcible entry and detainer would not lie to recover
possession held under a contract of sale.
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it was granted. In its opinion, the court said that where by a con-
tract the seller is entitled to immediate possession in case of de-
fault and the paid-in amounts are treated as rent and forfeited,
then ejectment will lie. The court further stated that no redemp-
tion would be allowed because the contract expressly declared
that upon default the seller could cancel it and no contract existed
to redeem. The other tests discussed above were not mentioned
by the court.
Thus it is apparent that the equity of redemption as it is known
in the law of mortgages does not exist in the law of land contracts.
If the seller elects to foreclose the contract as a mortgage, the
buyer's equity is recognized. In this instance, the seller usually
desires a later action for the deficiency. If a foreclosure action is
instituted, the buyer would also be entitled to an accounting for
rents and profits received by the seller in possession. 0 3 But the
seller may also have the land by forfeiture when he declares the
contract at an end and ejects the buyer. According to the Johnson
case, the buyer is not entitled to an accounting or damages from
a seller in possession or a return of his payments'0 4 unless the
contract has so provided. It can be seen from the foregoing il-
lustrations that the equity of redemption may exist solely at the
election of the seller and that the buyer may be relegated to the
protection he would have under contract law. It is apparent that
to be in a position to commence strict foreclosure, the seller need
only insert clauses in the contract providing that: (1) time is of
the essence, 1 5 (2) the seller is entitled to immediate possession
in case of default, (3) amounts paid in shall be considered as rents
or damages, (4) the entire amount is due and owing on default,"",
and (5) the contract shall be forfeited and at an end at the election
of the seller. 167
E. RESCISSION AND RESTITUTION
Generally, a buyer may rescind the contract when the seller
has misrepresented a material fact concerning the subject matter
163 Abbass v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949).
164 Kear v. Hausmann, 152 Neb. 512, 41 N.W.2d 850 (1950).
105 Dodge v. Galusha, 151 Neb. 753, 39 N.W.2d 539 (1949).
166 Colson v. Johnson's Estate, III Neb. 773, 197 N.W. 674, 35 A.L.R.
924 (1924), where it was said that without such a provision, the
yendor can only sue for those amounts due and owing.
167 Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb. 330, 75 N.W.2d 717 (1956).
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of the contract or has defaulted in performance. It has been pointed
out that the buyer may elect to sue for specific performance, dam-
ages or restitution. Each action, when elected, precludes the other
remedies. In restitution, the buyer denies the further existence
of the contract and seeks only a return of the status quo by having
his purchase money returned to him. 168 The essence of restitlition
is the denial of the contract and substantial compliance by the
buyer. He must come into equity with clean hands. Frequently,
it happens that the parties, after default, renegotiate with each
other to restore the contract. The buyer, if he assents to other
and different performance by the seller, forfeits his right to rescind.
Under a contract where time is of the essence, the promisor must
perform on the date set for performance or he has breached the
contract a-d given the promisee an opportunity to rescind. 69 On
the other hand, where time is not of the essence, the promisor
may tender performance within a reasonable time after perform-
ance date and not be in default. 70
There is some confusion in the earlier Nebraska cases con-
cerning the effect of an election to rescind. One case held that
a buyer in default could recover his payments after the seller
rescinded and sold the land to another. 17' This case was later
criticized by the court, and it has never been followed. The rule
now is that a buyer in default cannot recover his payments from
a seller who has rescinded. 72  Conduct by the buyer after the
seller's default which causes the seller to proceed with the con-
tract amounts to a waiver. So, where the buyer demanded that
the seller institute a quiet title action in order to produce a mar-
ketable title, it was held that the right to rescind had been
waived. 73
When a buyer has rescinded, he must be prepared as a con-
dition precedent to an action for the return of the payments to
168 Dent v. Johnson, 111 Neb. 162, 195 N.W.2d 539 (1949), where the
vendee was allowed restitution.
169 Dodge v. Galusha, 151 Neb. 753, 39 N.W.2d 539 (1949); Kear v. Haus-
mann, 152 Neb. 512, 41 N.W.2d 850 (1950).
170 Klapka v. Shrauger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938); Seaver v.
Hall, 50 Neb. 878, 70 N.W. 373 (1897), affirmed 52 Neb. 316, 72 N.W.
217 (1897).
171 Eaton v. Redick, 1 Neb. 305 (1871). This decision was later criticized
in Patterson v. Murphy, 40 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1 (1894).
172 Maloy v. Muir, 62 Neb. 80, 86 N.W. 916 (1901).
173 Shonsey v. Clayton, 107 Neb. 695, 187 N.W. 113 (1922).
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give up possession and release the contract on the record.174 Also,
it is incumbent upon the rescinding party to tender performance
at the time of his' election unless it is obvious that it would be
futile to do so. 175 An interesting case on this point is Hawkins
v. Mullen,'76 in which the seller sought to clear his title against
a defaulting buyer. The court held that the seller must do equity
by refunding the buyer's payments in order to rescind. At the
buyer's request, the payments were given the status of a mortgage
on the land and foreclosure was decreed. The holding, although
a complete reversal of the foreclosure theory, is sound for it
recognizes the buyer's legal interest in the land.177
VI. CONCLUSION
Where then, does Nebraska stand in regard to the buyer-seller
relationship? As has been illustrated, the foreclosure by judicial
sale used in mortgage law is very acceptable. The nine months
stay of foreclosure is adequate protection for the errant buyer to
plant and harvest another crop. It also forces sellers into making
concessions from strict contract terms. Under the present law,
the prudent seller may use contracts for the purpose of avoiding
the costly and time consuming process of judicial foreclosure. In
theory, the rules against clogs on the equity of redemption, bidding
in and so forth are applicable only to the law of mortgages. Serious
consideration should be given as to why these rules are accepted
in land contract law only when the seller chooses statutory fore-
closure.
To allow a seller who is in the superior position to begin with
to "shop at the counter of remedies" so that he can never lose
even when the land has seriously depreciated in value is to dis-
courage the successful conveyance of land to low equity buyers.
174 Schlake v. Healey, 108 Neb. 35, 187 N.W. 427 (1922); Watkins v.
Harrison, 110 Neb. 439, 194 N.W. 435 (1923).
175 Klapka v. Shrauger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938); Sponsler
v. Max, 113 Neb. 477, 203 N.W. 566 (1925). See also Olson v. Woodhouse,
112 Neb. 527, 199 N.W. 815 (1924).
176 118 Neb. 129, 223 N.W. 670 (1929).
177 See 17 Neb. L. Bul. 54 (1938), where the case is discussed as a
recognition of a vendee's lien. In a later action between the parties,
the court upheld the seller's right to a stay of foreclosure. Hawkins
v. Mullen, 119 Neb. 567, 230 N.W. 252 (1930). Compare with Har-
rington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176, 56 N.W. 961 (1893) where buyer was
denied stay in strict foreclosure proceedings.
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Where the land has depreciated so far that it will not satisfy the
seller's equity, a possible solution is to require the seller to accept
his proportionate share of the loss and forego deficiency judg-
ments. This may be extreme, however, where third party creditors
are involved. The essential principle, though, is not to allow the
buyer equity as recognized by mortgage law to become obscured
by other measures of value, such as damages.
